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Abstract: Are the challenges of globalization, technology and competition exercising 
a dramatic impact on professional practice whilst, in the process, compromising 
traditional notions of professionalism, autonomy and discretion? This paper engages 
with these debates and uses original, qualitative empirical data to highlight the vast 
areas of continuity that exist even the largest globalizing law firms. Whilst it is 
undoubted that growth in the size of firms and their globalization bring new 
challenges, these are resolved in ways that are sensitive to professional values and 
interests. In particular, a commitment to professional autonomy and discretion still 
characterises the way in which these firms operate and organize themselves. This 
situation is explained in terms of the development of an organizational model of 
professionalism, whereby the large organization is increasingly emerging as a primary 
locus of professionalization and whereby professional priorities and objectives are 
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Recent work (Ackroyd, 1996; Brock et al. 1999; Cooper et al. 1996; 
Greenwood and Hinings, 1993; 1996; Reed, 1996; Hanlon, 1999) has stressed how 
professions, as specific occupations, and professionalism, as a peculiar way of 
organizing work, are undergoing unprecedented change. A series of exogenous 
developments including globalization, the new opportunities offered by technology, 
and the impact of neo-liberal ideologies, policies and legislation, have all been 
highlighted as fuelling processes of professional re-organization and consolidation 
(Ackroyd and Muzio, 2007; Abel, 1988; Hanlon 1999; Muzio and Ackroyd, 2005, 
Pinnington and Morris, 2003). In this context it has been suggested that the 
professions are adopting more managed patterns of operation and an increasingly 
commercial outlook (Cooper et al. 1996; Flood, 1996). This has signalled a shift in 
the debate away from the traditional terminology of the de-
professionalization/proletarianisation hypothesis, towards questions of 
managerialization and commercialization that are said to create new challenges for 
professionalism and for traditional notions of ‘professional dominance’ (Freidson 
1970b; Johnson, 1972). The new role of the professions as providers of value-adding, 
commercially-orientated services to business implies the gradual displacement of 
traditional ideals of professionalism or, at minimum, their contamination with the 
alternative logics of entrepreneurship and managerialism (Brock et al. 1999; Cooper 
et al. 1996; Covaleski et al. 1998; Hanlon, 1999).  
In this paper, we consider the implications of recent structural changes in large 
professional services firms (PSFs)i for professionalism as an abstract occupational 
principle and mode of organizing work.  We use original empirical material to 
 5 
examine the peculiarities of professional practice within globalizing law firms and 
consider how sociological frameworks can be better used to interpret recent processes 
of change. In particular, we argue that a re-coupling of sociological understandings of 
professionalism to organizational theory, through the concept of organizational 
professionalism, might allow us to track the recent trajectory of professionalism as a 
distinct work-organization method. This theoretical concept postulates the emergence 
of new patterns professional work increasingly centred on the activity of large PSFs. 
In this context, professional systems of work are increasingly bound to organizational 
strategies, tactics, systems and methods as well as to the initiatives and financial 
performance of these new ‘corporate’ actors (Covaleski et al. 1998; Kirkpatrick and 
Ackroyd, 2003). However, as we show, the exercise of such managerial coordination 
and organizational control is only possible when it meshes with and complements 
professionalism.  
 6 
The ‘organizational turn’ in the study of professionalism  
 
Whilst much has historically been said about the realities professional work in 
organizational settings (Scott 1965; Montagna, 1968), comparatively little, with the 
exception of studies such as Mintzberg’s work on the professional bureaucracy 
(1979), has been said on the peculiarities of professional organizations. However, as 
Hinings (2005) suggests, research over the last fifteen years has begun to counter this 
imbalance. The case of the legal profession is indicative of why this transition is 
important.  The days in which legal work equated to sole practice or family based 
partnership have been replaced by an era where ‘mega-law’ firmsii, employing 
thousands of solicitors often in dozens of jurisdictions and generating multi-million 
pound profits, are the norm rather than the exception (Abel 1988; Flood, 1996). It is 
perhaps unsurprising, then, that professional service firms, such as the law practices in 
question here, are not only increasingly relevant to organizational theory but also to 
our understanding of professionalism and professionalization.  
In this context the contribution of archetype theory (Greenwood and Hinings, 
1988; 1993; 1996; Cooper et al., 1996; Brock et al., 1999; Hinings, 2005) is 
particularly significant. The notion of “archetype” is used here to indicate the 
hegemonic system of underpinning values, guiding objectives and supporting 
structures that define and characterise a particular organizational configuration. This 
is not only insightful because of the way it helps us to examine the empirical 
development of professional practice in the contemporary era, but also insofar as it 
begins to point out the mutually reinforcing links between professional values and 
organizational structures. In this context, the search for efficiency and enhanced 
functionality is said to be fuelling a process of archetypal migration, whereby 
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professional organizations are abandoning the traditional professional archetype (P2) 
based on ideas of partnership, collegiality and informality associated with 
autonomous, unmanaged professional work, and re-emerging as Managed 
Professional Businesses (MPB), characterised by increasing levels of managerialism, 
bureaucracy and commercialism (Brock et al. 1999; Cooper et al. 1996; Hinings, 
2005). Of course, there is a growing awareness of how such processes of change are 
always fragmented and contested rather than transformational and complete. In 
particular, Cooper et al. (1996) introduce the concept of sedimentation to indicate how 
new values and practices are erected on foundations imbued with residual allegiances 
to previous archetypal configurations. This recognition leads to the increasing 
contemplation of hybrid forms of professional organization, where new and old 
inevitably co-penetrate each other (Pinnington and Morris, 2003; Hinings, 2005). 
However, despite these increasingly nuanced perspectives, archetype theory 
ultimately identifies a broad trajectory of change characterised by the contamination 
of professional values with entrepreneurial attitudes and managerial priorities as well 
as the gradual convergence of professional structures around more corporate 
configurations. However, less consideration has been given by these studies to the 
ways professionals may be able to absorb, adapt and reconcile new methods, practices 
and vocabularies drawn from the world of management and business with traditional 
notions of professional autonomy, discretion and independence. This, we feel, is an 
important lacuna in existing research which raises significant questions about the 
future of professionalism as a distinct occupational principle.  
 
These and other theoretical limits of archetype theory have been discussed 
extensively elsewhere (Ackroyd and Muzio, 2007; Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2007; 
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Kirkpatrick and Ackroyd, 2003); our departure point here is to build on these critiques 
and suggest that archetype theory may have gone too far in its important rediscovery 
and re-development of the organizational theme, leaving behind too many of the 
broader concerns associated with the sociology of the professions. This has important 
implications as it somewhat reduces the reliability of some of the empirical 
hypotheses and predictions associated with archetype theory. In particular, 
suggestions of a marked process of managerializationiii and commercialisation 
threatening and displacing traditional notions of professional autonomy and discretion 
(Freidson 1970b; 2001) may yet, in law firms at least we contend, prove overstatediv.  
 
The Sociology of the (Organizational) Professions 
 
At the heart of our approach is an attempt to re-introduce concepts from the sociology 
of the professions so as to better understand the ways managerialism has influenced 
the organization of PSFs. We begin this by recognising Johnson’s definition of 
professionalism as a ‘peculiar type of occupational control rather than an expression 
of the inherent nature of particular occupations’ (1972: 45). Professionalism is, thus, 
framed as a particular work organization method, where the workers themselves, 
rather than ‘consumers in an open market [entrepreneurship] or functionaries of a 
centrally planned and administered firm or state [managerialism]’ (Freidson, 1994: 
32), retain control over work, which, ideally, includes ‘the social and economic 
methods of organising the performance of [such] work’ (Freidson, 1970a: 185). This 
contrasts with alternative occupational principles, such as entrepreneurship and 
managerialism, where work is organised according to either contractual relationships 
in (relatively) open markets or through a rational-legal apparatus of formal regulations 
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implemented through managerial hierarchies. This occupational autonomy, along with 
other rewards, is secured through a conscious and sustained political effort: a 
professional project (Larson, 1977), aimed at translating a scarce set of cultural and 
technical resources into a secure and institutionalised system of social and financial 
rewards.  
This is fluid and dynamic project that is grounded in history and emerges from 
continuous negotiations set in a broader political and economic order. Thus, this 
emerges as a flexible and contingent construct which over time mobilizes different 
claims, methods and systems, as established tactics lose effectiveness and go out of 
favour. We draw on this insight below to recognise how, in the current period, 
professionalism is increasingly located within organizational contexts and, therefore, 
increasingly infused with organizational logics, practices and strategies. Taking such 
an approach, we argue, offers the opportunity to move beyond debates about 
professionalism versus managerialism and the different points on a trajectory of 
change from one to another by recognising the new mutations and hybrid forms of 
professionalsim that are emerging as professionals respond to new pressures and 
challenges.  
 
Data collection methods 
The following sections are based on insights gathered through a total of 40 
interviews with partners working in globalizing law firms. These comprised of an 
initial set of 15 interviews conducted in 2003-2004 where the focus of the discussions 
was not on professionalism per se but more generically on the coordination of work 
and learning in globalizing legal PSFs. This was followed by 25 interviews, 
conducted between August 2005 and January 2006, specifically focussing upon 
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professionalism and professional practice. It is from the latter round of interviews that 
we draw the empirical material reported here. Table 1 provides more detail on the 
interviewees and the firms they were drawn from. Table 2 presents information on the 
characteristics of these globalizing law firms. The quotations used below have been 
made anonymous with a description of the role of the interviewee and the firm they 
worked for. The size of the firm is described in terms of large, medium or small 
relative to those listed in table 2. All except two interviews were tape recorded and 
fully transcribed. Analysis took the form of a grounded theory approach (Glaser and 
Straus, 1967) relying on the informed coding and extraction of quotes to highlight 
relevant processes, practices and constraints on organization and professionalism in 
the firms studied.   
 
[tables 1 & 2 here] 
 
Organizational professionalism in globalizing legal PSFs 
Globalizing law firms are, of course, much smaller in size than accountancy 
firmsv. This is in part the result of historical legacies with, at least until the 1990s, the 
liberalisation of legal markets taking place at a relatively slow pace. Similarly, unlike 
accountancy standards, truly international law has failed to emerge and transnational 
agreements still need to be enacted through national legal systems. Nevertheless, the 
now well-established cohort of globalizing law firms (table 2) present particularly 
insightful case-studies of organization in globalizing, mid-sized PSFs with many 
parallels existing to ongoing processes in other professions such as architecture. 
 The limited literature that exists on the globalization of law firms (e.g. 
Beaverstock et al. 1999; Empson, 2007; Faulconbridge, 2007; Faulconbridge and 
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Muzio, 2007; Flood, 1996; Morgan and Quack, 2005) suggests that the primary aim 
of these firms is to provide effective and efficient business services in a globally 
integrated manner. It could, therefore, be assumed that these organizations would, as a 
matter of necessity, have converged towards a managed professional business 
archetype where control and co-ordination of work are relinquished by professionals 
and placed in the hands of a dedicated managerial cadre. Yet, our interviews revealed 
how the professional identities and strategic jostling of partners in law firms has often 
prevented the emergence of a entirely coherent and systematic approach to 
management. Whilst some changes have begun to take shape, this is in the context of 
subtle reconfigurations as lawyers increasingly operate within an organizational 
model of professionalism that does not necessarily erode professional codes of 
practice. As one lawyer noted about this trend:  
“One of the reasons professionals, and particularly lawyers, become professionals is 
they are quite defensive and proud of the fact that they have a considerable amount of 
autonomy. And one of the issues that any management in a law firm has to deal with 
is the trade-off between maintaining lawyers’ autonomy and being consistent between 
partners and developing a strategy that lawyers can buy into” (2, managing partner of 
London office of large English firm).  
 
The reflexive and resourceful behaviour of the key actors in legal PSFs – the legal 
professionals themselvesvi – is, then, the key driver of continuity alongside forms of 
change (Pinnington and Morris, 2003). We further exemplify this below by 
considering the type of management coordination that exists in the globalizing law 
firms studied and relating this to the three categories of control – strategic, market-
financial and operating - identified by the seminal work of Cooper et al (1996).  
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Strategic control: avoiding managerial cadres through ‘committee-isation’  
Rising levels of strategic control, according to Cooper et al. (1996, 630), 
involves the emergence of analytical strategies and directive decision-making relating 
to business development. In law firms this includes, firstly, strategies to avoid the 
ever-present risk of conflicts of interest when accepting new clients and, secondly the 
formulation of market-positioning strategies which allow the development of a 
reputation for expertise in one or several complementary areas of legal practice.  
 
Conflicts of interest 
Conflicts of interest have to be managed effectively in any law firm. This is all 
the more challenging when there are hundreds of partners recruiting clients 
throughout the world. This does not, however, imply the removal of client cultivation 
(rain-making) from individual lawyers. Rather, it means that some form of centralised 
seal of approval must be given to all new work. This often takes the form of a 
dedicated partner reviewing all new business and conflict of interest checks being 
completed by support staff.  This approach was taken in all of the firms studied, 
although the smaller firms did tend to involve all partners through email based 
consultation.  
In some ways, the individual in charge of this process could be said to be 
acting in a managerial capacity, hampering professional autonomy and taking control 
over the ‘ends’ of lawyers’ work (Freidson, 2001). After all, he/she has the power to 
interfere with a partner’s discretion to work for a particular client. However, the 
subtleties of the process suggest this is not necessarily the case. At the most basic 
level, the partner responsible for signing-off new business normally remains a 
practising professional. Interestingly, then, there continues to be little room in these 
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PSFs for the very substantial cadre of non-fee earning managers (technostructure) that 
often exists in large organizational settings (Mintzberg, 1979). Rather, we have 
professionals organizing professionals in a manner that all involved find acceptable. 
In addition, the strategies for managing conflicts, which are designed by professionals 
themselves, are setup to maintain the autonomy and entrepreneurial abilities of 
partners. As one lawyer commented: 
“we have structures to avoid conflicts, there is a new client intake process…We’re a 
transaction driven firm and you don’t want a situation where you could have had a 
primary role on a deal but because someone had done something small in the past 
you’re going to get dinged. But having got through that firewall as it were, then 
you’re away at the races to do things in your own way” (9, London-based head of 
practice group in medium sized US firm).     
 
Professionals continue, then, to be able to control their own work within a relatively 
broad framework. However, as no lawyer wishes her/his name to be tarnished by 
involvement, unintentionally or otherwise, in a conflict situation, the coordination that 
exists actually sustains rather than destroys the professional project. This approach 
means lawyers maintain their autonomy but also their occupational-mandated ethical 
standards in situations where it would otherwise be impossible to avoid conflicts of 
interest. We, therefore, have the redesigning of professional occupation systems 
around large-scale organizational logics, rather than their replacement.  
 
Strategy and vision: committee-based rather than individual professionalism 
In the context of an increasingly competitive marketplace, corporate strategy 
and formal development plans have become significant for law firms. Here our 
argument does not diverge from that put forward in MPB models (e.g. Cooper et al. 
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1996). Where we do differ, however, is in our interpretation of the ‘managerialism’ 
associated with strategy formulation.  
Unsurprisingly, firms display diverse approaches to strategy. The bigger firms 
look more like the MPB archetype than their smaller counterparts where it easier to 
engage in the type of peer observation and informal control processes traditionally 
associated with professional self-regulation and the P2 archetype. The larger firms 
studied require practice groups to have a clearly defined strategic mission that 
identifies target clients and practice areas. However, such approaches do not 
necessarily compromise the professional project and its traditional objectives. 
Autonomy is afforded within the guidelines set by the strategic plan and most lawyers 
join or remain with a firm because of their interest in the practice areas targeted. 
Indeed, being focussed is often seen as one of the new advantages of being part of a 
professional-organizational setup. It creates a peer group with expertise in the same 
domains of law that can be learned from and called upon for support in a transaction. 
It also attracts elite clients who seek out the best lawyers with the largest teams for the 
most challenging work. As described below, such work entails placing control of 
means in the hands of professionals, thus reinforcing their autonomy.  
At the opposite end of the spectrum, some of the smaller firms have more 
generic strategic visions. These firms select particular practice areas they wish to 
focus upon (e.g. Mergers & Acquisitions) but are non-prescriptive in terms of how 
these specialisms are developed. As a lawyer in such a firm suggested: 
“when I joined [firm x] I asked what the business plan was and was given a blank 
sheet of paper and told, there it is. You’re given discretion to do what ever you think 
is going to further the firm’s objectives” (10, London-based head of practice group in 
medium-size US firm).   
 
 15 
Perhaps surprisingly the firm quoted above is more profitable than some of the 
practices who use more formulaic strategy-making processes, suggesting how one of 
the main tenets of managerialism – raising efficiency and profitability – might be 
somewhat disputable. It should also be noted that there are some geographical 
differences in strategic approaches. Throughout the interviews it was clear that most 
US firms preferred to replicate strategies overseas as they ‘roll-out’ replica services 
worldwide (Morgan and Quack, 2005). English originating law firms, in line with the 
wider experiences of British multinationals (Ackroyd, 2002), were often much more 
tolerant of local variability as they allowed local partners to develop sectors as they 
saw fit in each market. We will return to this issue below.   
Most importantly, whether more formulaic and directional in style or broad 
and non-prescriptive, decisions relating to strategy (where needed) and strategic 
overview (in all cases) are administered by the professionals themselves, in a 
consensual rather than directive fashion. All of the firms studied locate strategic 
planning at the practice group, rather than the firm-wide level. This is a reflection of 
the nuance-filled nature of professional practice and the fact that the means-ends 
connections and priorities of professionals differ depending on their area of expertise. 
Although all firms have a senior partner or otherwise who heads-up the firm, his role 
(and they are all men in the firms in table 2 at the time of writing) is symbolic rather 
than executive. The actual decision-making and strategy-formulation is usually 
coordinated (but not managed) by a committee of partners elected to represent their 
office or, for global strategy committees, their office or practice group. These 
individuals consult with their peers and, based on what was described as a bubbling-
up process, put forward proposals relating to the strategic direction of the firm or 
practice group. In effect, committees represent a recalibrated from of P2 organizing. 
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One lawyer noted that in her/his firm, “the framework is put together through a 
combination of consensus and trial and error” (Interviewee 5, partner in London 
office of medium-sized US firm). Thus, there is a limited role for analytical, rational 
strategy-building, as proposed in managed-professional business frameworks. Rather, 
consensual if not collegial decision making, similar to the mutual adjustment and 
consensus building that Mintzberg (1979) connects with the management of 
professionals and their work, is reconfigured to fit new contexts. As a lawyer who was 
part of the committee for the corporate practice group in his firm commented: 
“On the ground here I might say we should be doing something and then I will 
discuss it with colleagues in the States…And people might have a limited 
understanding of what’s going on in other jurisdictions but your want to get their 
support” (6, London-based co-head of practice group in smaller US firm). 
   
In addition, even though these committees are the new forums for professional 
decision-making, the ‘whole partner vote’ continues to be the ultimate mechanism for 
approving the most significant strategic decisions. However, as suggested in the next 
quote, this normally acts more as a symbolic gesture. The ‘bubbling up’ process 
ensures that the beliefs of the vast majority of partners are considered prior to any 
decision:  
“Partnerships are funny things…constitutionally the board has absolute power to 
decide what it likes and when I was managing partner in New York I could tell 
people what to do. But it’s a bit like being the captain of the ship. You can stand on 
the bridge and say ‘turn left’ but if someone down there doesn’t do it you’re going to 
hit the rocks. So you cannot manage a law firm in the same way as you can in a 
corporation where there’s a power structure and someone orders you to do something, 
and this is the reporting line, it just doesn’t work…What you do find at all levels 
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within these structures, at practice group level or geography, is a process of ideas 
bubbling up, consultation coming down, well before you ever get to the decision 
level… And no vote would be put to the partnership unless whoever was proposing it 
knew it would get through” (22, Managing partner, New York office of large English 
firm).  
 
Predictably it was widely agreed that such organization wasn’t a ‘text book’ case in 
efficiency. At times it can take an excessive amount of time to reach a compromise 
and respond to rapidly changing market conditions. In some US firms the desire to 
roll-out practices from the home-country meant that the all-partner vote was less 
common. Instead, managing or founding partners have more powers vested in them 
by the partnership constitution. However, even here, the challenge of garnering the 
support of partners could not be ignored and excessive command and control tactics 
were recognised to result in dissatisfaction and high partner turnover. The 
consultation process, despite its delays and complications, was widely recognised, 
therefore, as the only way to organize law firms.  
We are not, then, arguing that law firms have not changed as they have 
globalized and grown in size. Rather, we suggest that more should be made of the 
subtle reconfigurations that have occurred in order to maintain professional principles 
but in the context of increasing scale and organizational challenges. As one lawyer 
quoted previously put it: 
“if you’re in a one person practice you have total autonomy, and you could chose to 
do whatever you like.  As soon as you get a partner you reduce the amount of 
autonomy you have. And of course, a two partner firm has a much greater amount of 
autonomy than a 50 partner firm.  And a 600 partner firm you’ve got a lot less 
autonomy than a 50 partner firm” (2).  
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Financial control and performance measures 
Cooper et al. (1996, 630) argue that using peer pressure as a mechanism to 
monitor performance in PSFs is increasingly being replaced by financial targets and 
performance monitoring. Evolutions in remuneration structures and staff appraisal 
systems are thought to be particularly indicative of these developments. The 
interviews completed suggested, however, that change towards such ‘managerial’ 
ideals is only partial, again because of the persistence of professional values. One of 
the underlying tenets of professionalism and in particular P2 forms of control is the 
commitment to technical excellence and service quality, even if this comes at the 
expense of financial performance. Reflecting this belief the formal assessment of 
partners, whilst now common in firms, is completed by peers rather than managers in 
all of the firms studied. This assesses quality as much as the quantity and profitability 
of work. As one lawyer noted: 
“there’s never anyone you have to account to on a weekly or monthly basis. The 
driver is really one of peer pressure. You are working with the brightest and most 
successful lawyers and the pressure is to perform to those standards…We have an 
annual appraisal done by a partner from another office and what you’re invited to do 
is think about ten categories.” (10, London-based head of practice group, US firm).    
 
One of these ten categories is revenue generation. This is more important in some 
firms than others. In particular, US firms tended to prioritise revenue generation 
through a remuneration model based on ‘eat what you kill’ principlesvii.  However, 
even in firms where profit-generation takes a more prominent role in appraising staff, 
there were clear examples of the continuation of P2 forms of management with 
professional principles shining through (long termism, professional autonomy, 
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collegiality, peer control, commitment to quality) and existing alongside these new 
criteria. Professionals have, then, absorbed and adapted the practices and language of 
management (annual reviews; key performance indicators; strategic plans etc.) but in 
ways that allow such models to be applied in a format sensitive to professional 
preferences, values and priorities. This can be understood as process of colonisation 
or even better hybridization, as an increasing attention for efficient management, 
which is necessitated by the challenges of governing what are complex and 
increasingly large global organizations, is reconciled (at least in the case of senior 
professionals) with an attachment to traditional notions of  consensus, collegiality and 
practitioner control over work.  Recent evolutions in remuneration models in 
globalizing law firms are indicative of this type of approach.  
 
Organizing remuneration around multiple professional cultures 
As described crudely above, there are well-recognised and important 
differences between English- and US-based law firms in terms of remuneration 
practices. We don’t want to review the underlying reasons for this here (but see 
Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2007; Flood, 1996; Morgan and Quack, 2005). We do, 
however, want to argue that such fundamental differences should not necessarily be 
taken to represent professional (lockstep) versus managerial (eat what you kill) 
approaches.  
In the firms studied, the remuneration systems (and performance measurement 
systems) had been designed and in many cases updated to meet the challenges 
associated with demands for efficiency and commercial-focus whilst at the same time 
pleasing professional tastes, preferences and sensibilities. As one lawyer described the 
ethos of remuneration in their ‘eat-what-you-kill’ firm: 
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“I don’t think there are objective measures. There are indications of what a successful 
partner is whether its hours or fees generation…But these are by no means 
absolutes…you do see partners who simply are able to generate clients through force 
of their own personality because their particular skill set are getting people through 
the door and for the long term of the business that’s vital…There are also people who 
are willing to spend time recruiting and training staff and these are bloody important 
parts of the business and something I believe it’s our responsibility to do” (3, partner, 
small US firm’s London office). 
Remuneration systems are usually designed by remuneration committees staffed by 
lawyers drawn from various worldwide offices. The aim of this is to offer a political 
compromise between the contrasting approaches of lawyers from different 
jurisdictions to pay and assessment. This points to another important failing of 
existing portrayals of the MPB approach: the lack of sensitivity to the geographical 
variability in the characteristics of law firm management. We discuss this in detail 
elsewhere (Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2007) but with regards to our present argument, 
it is clear that ‘managerialism’ may hold different meanings across space whilst its 
extent and impact on law firms will vary in accordance to geographical context.  
 
Operational control and autonomy 
Cooper et al. (1996, 630) also note that increasing degrees of centralization 
should be expected in a MPB configuration with control over work being taken out of 
the hands of professionals and placed in the hands of managers and their routine-
driven systems that optimise profits and efficiency. However, according to Mintzberg 
(1979) and others (Alvesson, 2002; Friedson, 2001; Morris and Empson, 1998) this 
contradicts the necessities of professional work. Allowing professionals discretion and 
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judgement is said to be essential so that the bespoke and complex services they 
provide can be effectively delivered.  
Even in the largest firms studied, partners retained control over the planning 
and execution of their work. Whilst transactions vary from the ordinary (e.g. a reverse 
triangular merger where two firms become one) through to the truly unique (e.g. the 
first public-private partnership agreements in the UK in the late 1990’s), each project 
is approached in a way determined by the ‘lead’ partner. This means using her/his 
experience, as well as that of other team members, to identify the optimal way 
forward and individually tailor the service to the clients needs. In this context, 
operational issues are treated as a matter for professional judgement and discretion. 
As one lawyer described their autonomy: 
“I think in a large firm there is a need for autonomy, in that you’re only going to do 
your best if it’s an area you’re interested in and ultimately you play to your strengths 
and let your instincts guide your work. However, if you don’t coordinate that with the 
strengths of the firm it won’t be successful and it won’t be good for the firm” (19, 
partner in English law firm’s New York office). 
 
As the quote suggests, this does not mean degrees of coordination are not now 
important in large PSFs. Indeed, the work of largest firms listed in table 2 may also 
involve more routine activities. Here associates (and not partners) may spend part of 
their career following recipe-like procedures writing, for example, bond contracts. 
However, this is often a training ground before moving onto the bespoke work that 
grants autonomy. Smaller firms, which are often more profitable per unit of income, 
tend to focus solely upon high-end, high fee generating work that never involves 
‘commoditised’ practice.   
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Professional ideals also spill over into other facets of operational control. For 
any PSF the development and honing of new talent is essential (Alvesson, 2002). 
Consequently, it might seem sensible to put the strategic control of associate 
development in the hands of a cadre of managers (and remove it from professionals) – 
i.e. to both centralize and beaurocratize the training and development function. 
However, in globalizing law firms, whilst there might be global ‘inductions’ or 
‘conferences’ for newly recruited trainees/associates, the training and development of 
lawyers is otherwise decentralised to the office and even individual professional-level. 
Indeed, as the following comment describes, it is common for partners to engage in or 
abstain from associate development as they see fit and use their own preferred 
mentoring strategies: 
“I think the efficacy of the mentoring role and how it works in practice varies quite a 
lot between partners. And it’s quite hard to get consistency. It certainly is informal 
but it will vary from practice group to practice group and from individuals. In London 
it’s actually pretty informal and there isn’t any compulsion to do certain things” (6, 
London-based head of practice group in medium-sized US firm).   
 
Discussion and conclusions 
There have been extensive theoretical discussions of the changing influences 
upon professional practice (e.g. Brock et al. 1999; Greenwood et al. 1990; Hanlon, 
1999; Cooper et al. 1996) and there seems little doubt that professionalism is 
increasingly advanced through organizational tactics and methods, something the 
empirical material supports. In one sense this situation can be characterised as an 
extension of Mike Reed (1996) category of organizational profession. In its original 
formulation this included those occupations, such as managers, administrators and 
technicians which developed and prospered within the interstices of large bureaucratic 
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organizations. At the heart of these occupations’ success lay their ability to mobilise 
their positional power to close-off and monopolise ‘relatively powerful and privileged 
positions within technical and status hierarchies’ (Reed, 1996: 585). In other words, 
these groups prosper from their ability to control the bureaucratic machinery they 
inhabit and to resolve central problems of their business organization through various 
processes of technological rationalization and managerial intervention.  
In today’s context it seems that this situation is increasingly relevant to the 
liberal/independent professions, of which solicitors represent a paradigmatic example. 
Indeed, it could be argued that we are witnessing a shift towards a new form of 
professionalism, organizational professionalism, whereby the organization and its 
bureaucratic apparatus is becoming the main locus of professional activity. In this 
context, the traditional values, objectives and rewards connected with 
professionalization projects are increasingly achieved and secured through the support 
of appropriate organizational systems, structures and procedures. Yet, our analysis 
suggests that these organizational tactics and mechanisms are ultimately defined and 
influenced by professional interests. In particular, it seems that the lawyers studied 
continue to enjoy high degrees of autonomy and, in line with the traditions of 
professionalism, retain substantial amounts of control over their work and service 
delivery, despite financial and market pressures. This is, of course, secured at the cost 
of a growing process of polarization as professional elites use organizational 
mechanisms (such as leveraging, internal closure and the use of performance 
targets/appraisal systems) to extract value from an increasingly elongated and 
formalised division of labour (Ackroyd and Muzio, 2007).  
Of course, it would be misleading to argue that there is a total absence of 
managerial positions, roles and practices in large (global) professional organizations. 
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However, as we have argued through the empirical material, these are reconstituted, 
adapted and even subverted to suit and sustain professional values, norms and 
objectives. The fact that managerial procedures and roles are largely ceremonial and 
symbolic (e.g. managing/senior partner) and that those involved are usually practising 
professionals themselves, sensitive to the interests, opinions and voices of their 
constituency, is a key part of this process. The case of the law firms under 
consideration, then, constitutes an example of organizational professionalism where 
professionals design organizational strategies and structures to maintain their 
professional occupational principles and objectives. This, then, notwithstanding the 
significance of current change, is an approach that is profoundly different from 
managerialism, despite sharing some of its characteristics (Freidson, 2001; Freidson, 
1994). 
In conclusion, we would suggest that the theoretical frameworks underlying 
explanations of recent changes in large professional firms, in particular those using 
the ideas of bureaucracy versus professionalism, need to place more emphasis on the 
ongoing negotiations involved in change and the hybrid forms that are emerging as a 
result of these. Organizational professionalism, with its emphasis on the 
interconnection and hybridization between occupational and organizational principles, 
offers a way of conceptualising contemporary PSFs and their development. Here we 
have only provided a snapshot of organizational professionalism in one type of 
professional organization, the global law firm. In the future we, therefore, suggest 
there is a need for further studies of both a wider range of law firms and the subtleties 
of inter-industry variation in professional organization and other PSFs. As Empson 
(2007) indicates, the ideal of professionalism now seems to exist in a multitude of 
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ways across as a result of the evolutions we have described, something that deserves 
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Position of interviewees 
Allen & Overy 0  1 Managing Partner 
Baker & McKenzie 2 Partner (x2) 1 Partner 
Clifford Chance 2 Managing Partner; Partner 5 Managing Partner;  Partner and Co-head of 
practice group; Partner (x3) 
Dechert 1 Partner and Co-head of practice group 1 Partner and Co-head of practice group 
DLA Piper Rudnick 
Grey Cary* 
0  1 Partner 
Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer 
1 Partner and Co-head of practice group 1 Partner 
Jones Day 0  1 Partner 
Latham & Watkins 1 Partner 1 Partner 
Linklaters 1 Partner 1 Partner 
Shearman Sterling 1 Partner 1 Partner 
Sidley Austin Brown 
& Wood 
0  1 Partner 
Skadden Arps Slate 
Meagher & Flom 
3 Partner and Co-head of practice group 
(x2); Partner 
3 Partner and head practice group (x2);  
Partner 
Weil Gotshal & 
Manges 
0  3 Partner;  Partner and Co-head of practice 
group (x2) 
White & Case 0  2 Partner and head of practice group; Partner 
Other firms – not in 











Table 1. Information on interviewees. 
Source: The Lawyer (2005) and fieldwork. 
*: figures based on the combined values for the firms DLA and Piper Rudnick who have now merged. 










































































Global offices  
 
 









































































Jones Day (USA) 649.2 443/624/1452 29 1:2.3 27 29 
Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Derringer (English) 
780 506/0/1609 0 1:3.2 45 28 
 
















Skadden Arps Slate 
















































































Table 2   Characteristics of the leading firms in which interviews were completed, ranked by number of offices. 







                                                 
i
 The growing body of literature on PSFs includes a lively debate on their definition.  In this paper, we 
opt for a narrow take on this and focus on those organizations which operate under conditions of 
professional closure and regulation. This primarily includes law, accountancy and architectural 
practices that tend to employ qualified and certified professionals. 
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ii
 This consolidation reflects various considerations which have been explored more thoroughly in 
related publications (Ackroyd and Muzio, 2007; Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2007 and see also 
Beaverstock et al. 1999). Factors fuelling this growth include:  the advantages of economies of scale 
where attempts are made to increase profitability by augmenting leverage ratios; and perhaps most 
importantly in this case, the gravitational pull of globalizing clients and the opportunities offered by 
presence in new marketplaces.  
iii
 An interesting point concerns the possibility that change in the legal profession may reflect a 
jurisdictional dispute between solicitors and a newly emerging profession of management, pursuing its 
own professional project.  However, whilst sections of management may be professionalizing, the 
extent to which management is pursuing a collective occupational project is limited. Furthermore, most 
managers in PSFs tend to be experienced professionals who retain a strong primary affiliation with 
their professional identity. Accordingly, the threat posed by management is ideological rather than 
competitive.  
iv
 We limit our discussion here to law firms, and are guarded about generalising because of the variable 
scale and development of globalization in different PSFs. As we allude to later in the paper, more work 
is needed to understand how such practise might develop different across the professions.  
v
 Clifford Chance, the largest law firm in the world, employs 575 partners and almost 2500 lawyers. 
Most recent figures suggest it generates annual revenues of over just over 1 billion British Pounds (The 
Lawyer, 2006). Conversely, PWC, the world biggest accountancy firm, employs over 8000 partners 
and a total headcount of a 140,000. In 2006 this firm generated revenues of over 10.7 billion British 
Pounds (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2007).   
vi
 Here we focus upon only partners and there may be a different story to tell in relation to the 
experience of junior lawyers. 
vii
 ‘Eat what you kill’ models, used as the basis for remuneration by all of the US firms studied and a 
minority of the English firms, uses profits generated to determine the salary of a partner. This contrasts 
with ‘Lockstep’ models which are used by the majority of English firms and rely on years of service to 
determine remuneration. Here teamwork and contribution to the partnership can also be prioritised.   
